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Article 9

SHAME: BERGMAN ON
RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME

Leonard V. Kaplan'
"Where is this place?" Oedipus asks Antigone as they
enter Collonus, the famous dwelling place of the transformed
Eryns. This verse has captured me as powerfully as Hillel's
admonitions that if I do not stand for others, who will stand for
me? and "if not now when;"' Marx's admonition about the
"poverty of philosophy;"2 and Lenin's "what is to be done?"3
These few quotes tie humanity to place. They identify the
mystery of identity and ultimately, the need for action even in
the face of the ineffable or noumenal.
We live at a very dangerous time. It may be that every
time was dangerous. So be it. At this time global war is in the
air-a war to protect globalized economies under which a small
part of humanity does very well while most of humanity
struggles. Domestically, almost a banality but a truth, the poor
get poorer, the rich richer, the gap between skilled and
unskilled gets larger and the middle becomes more anxious. We
have a crisis in health delivery, an industrial prison complex,
continued poverty, a further disaffection from politics, a
breakdown of political leadership here and in much of the
world and a culture of complaint. At the more institutional
level, our courts are more politicized-not a new but a more
obvious condition than immediately in the past. The United
t Mortimer Jackson Professor of Law, the University of Wisconsin School
of
Law. I thank Mike Morgalla of the University of Wisconsin Law School Library Staff
for his invaluable research assistance.
I SAYINGS OF THE FATHERS, OR PIRKE ABOTH (Isaac Unterman ed. & trans.,
1964) ("If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if I am only for myself, what am
I? And if not now, when?").
2

See KARL MARX, THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY (1963).
See V.I. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BURNING QUESTIONS
OF OUR

MOVEMENT (1929). The first cite I can find to this famous Lenin query is from the Acts
of the Apostles. See THE WRITINGS OF ST. PAUL 1.60 (Wayne Meeks ed., 1972).
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States Supreme Court is more imperious, more activist and
more disdainful of Congressional power than anytime since its
struggle with the executive branch over the New Deal.4 State
legislatures and the U.S. Congress are captured by corporate
interests.
Perhaps I am overstating? How colored is my
consciousness by developmental trauma and adaptive
mechanisms? How prescient am I about reading the world as a
text through my own subjectivity? This is the very point of the
Essay: What difference does my assessment of national and
global conditions make to what I owe the world or what it owes
me? Or in the terms of this Symposium, what is my
responsibility, what is my potential blame and for what aspect
of the world am I responsible? These questions entail
assessments of the epistemological, ontological, ethical, legal
and, more generally, political understanding of what
responsibility means philosophically, theologically, legally and
politically. And what does theory along any of the fault lines
mean for individual and social practice both normatively and
empirically?
My view is not from nowhere but from here and now. It
is colored by theologies that are committed to the other, it is
unhappy with the liberal state both theoretically and actually
and it prefers the liberal state theoretically over many other
current alternatives. In the first part of this Essay, I briefly
discuss the role of responsibility under liberal and republican
theories of the state. This Essay then contemplates our
individual responsibility for what is currently happening. It
expresses no great faith in theory or writing against the
current grain, but that is the practice at hand and here we are.
So, I argue that we owe a responsibility to do more than we are
doing, but that we do not have the energy, time or money to do
more, and that we do not know what to do; this has
consequences for how we feel about ourselves, about the quality
of our life and souls. I do not posit an afterlife. This life is scary
and fascinating enough.
At the outset, I assert the following claims: (1) as an
individual, I am responsible no matter what I do; (2) we do not
do enough; (3) we do not know what to do; (4) structural
constraints and distortions rationalize present quietism; (5)
4 See JOHN T. NOONAN JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S
POWER, THE SUPREME

COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002).
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theory about the state of the state, though engaging, will be
unavailing in shaping particular persons to be more
responsible and effective in defining and addressing whatever
is seized upon as the current commodified evil; and (6) social
and intra-psychic motivational distinctions between shame and
guilt explain little about most structural politics and less than
we might hypothesize about interpersonal responses-at least
for responsible action in the public sphere.5 My object is to
explore these issues by analyzing Ingmar Bergman's film
Shame.6
In the second part of this Essay, I analyze and critique
Shame, placing it in context with the theological.7 Ultimately,
this Essay looks to the implications of theologically shaped
theories to ask about a theoretical advance beyond Bergman's
Shame. I propose that Bergman provides a suggestive
narrative to explore the problem of individual responsibility for
self, other and state. He provides a frame for both an ethic and
an argument that psychology is intimately related to ethics as
a matter of ontology. Bergman's view in this work complements
theologically informed philosophers of Jewish, Protestant and
Catholic orientation toward questions of responsibility,
particularly Emmanuel Levinas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Jan
Patocka respectively. It also accords with the strain of
metaphysics that Plato bequeathed to western thought.8
r Barrington Moore gave us the concept of the commodification of moral
outrage, meaning that, as a culture, we choose a particular social harm as a focus,
write and talk about it, perhaps research it, deliver policy papers, perhaps show a
modicum of institutional concern, then grow tired of the problem and turn to a new
outrage as the social harm de jour. BARRINGTON MOORE, INJUSTICE, THE SOCIAL BASES
OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT 500-05 (1972).
6 Screened in 1968, Shame starred Liv Ullmann and Max von Sydow. Sven
Nykvist was the director of photography. The film's Swedish title is Skammen.
For perhaps the best critical, complete analysis of Bergman's cinematic
work see PAISLEY LIVINGSTON, INGMAR BERGMAN AND THE RITUALS OF ART (1982). I am
indebted to Professors David Bordwell and Noel Carroll, each of whom suggested
Livingston's work when I' mentioned I was working on this Essay. Bergman himself
wrote an autobiography, THE MAGIC LANTERN (Joan Tate trans., 1988) and a critical
book on his films, IMAGES, MY LIFE IN FILM (Marianne Ruuth trans., 1994). In the
latter book, Bergman is critical of Shame. He sees the movie divided into two parts, one
about the events of war which he found wanting and another about the effects of war
which he felt was good. Id. at 298. He worried about the film's reaction and apparently
received little satisfaction, though the initial review in Sweden was very good. Id. The
film was nominated for best foreign picture but did not win the Academy Award. David
Shipman comments that Shame was one of two movies where Bergman "takes his place
as one of the great creative figures of [the twentieth] century." See DAVID SHIPMAN,
THE STORY OF CINEMA: A COMPLETE NARRATIVE HISTORY FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO
THE PRESENT 953 (1982).
8 This may be unsurprising since Bergman came out of a tradition akin to
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Contrasting drama with a particular set of philosophical claims
allows experiential testing of narrative plausibility and
perhaps even conditional truth of the representational
mimesis.
In important ways, the "theological" view of
responsibility that suffuses Shame is anti-liberal. It intimates
a direction for how one should live a life different from the
market and institutional demands of mass society survival. But
Bergman's vision, even where he suggests a positive direction,
remains bleak. Moreover, whatever the truth of my reading of
the film with respect to interpersonal obligation and the soul,
Bergman provides little direction toward how to reform
institutions to negate the chilling despair he represents. He
does not have to. Neither Plato, Hegel nor Rawls provided a
successful institutional frame for republican, liberal or any
other institutional array to shape conditions to avoid the world
that enervates and kills Bergman's players. Even Karl Marx
refused to offer a precise politics, asserting in very
enlightenment fashion in The Critique of the Gotha Program
that the workers would have to fashion the appropriate politics
together for themselves through struggle.9
In Part III, I call primarily on three thinkers to contrast
with Bergman: Emmanuel Levinas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and
Jan Patocka. Each of these three continues a personal
synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem, taking his ethical concerns
from Jerusalem, measured against philosophic rigor and
matched against competing philosophic analyses." In Susan
Handelman's terms, I seek possibilities in the "fragments of
redemption" currently available for anchoring a practice of
responsible public and private action."
Bonhoeffer's. Bonhoeffer was captured and executed by the Nazis for his part in the
Abvehr's conspiracy to kill Hitler. See generally DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS (1955).
9 Ralph Miliband concludes his then important The State in Capitalist
Society by calling on Marx's analysis in The Critique of the Gotha Programto conclude
that eventually the working class will work through all internal conflict and rally
toward a transformational politics. RALPH MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY (1969).
'o Jeffrey S. Shoulson argues persuasively that through history any defined
boundary separating Athens and Jerusalem has long been blurred. See JEFFREY S.
SHOULSON, MILTON AND THE RABBIS: HEBRAISM, HELLENISM, AND CHRISTIANITY (2001).

Nevertheless, prophetic Judaism ethically and stylistically presents very differently
from Greek-derived philosophy.
" See SUSAN A. HANDELMAN, FRAGMENTS OF REDEMPTION (1991); Susan A.
Handelman, Crossing and Recrossing the Void: A Letter to Gene, in REVIEWING THE
COVENANT:

EUGENE B. BOROWITZ

THEOLOGY (Peter Ochs ed., 2000).

AND

THE POSTMODERN

RENEWAL

OF JEWISH

20031
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LIBERAL AND REPUBLICAN THEORIES OF THE STATE AND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RESPONSIBLE SELF

The legal academy continues to debate the extent to
which the United States is a liberal or republican government.
This debate hinges on an intuition about the nature and
constitution of the self and the degree to which the self is selfdetermining. Republican theorists emphasize the contingency
of the self to the shaping community in which it develops.
Republican theory holds the self to be contingent, communally
in
ethos embodied
dependent. The communitarian
republicanism theory is central to certain aspects of feminist
and critical studies jurisprudence. The point of communitarian
theory, backed independently by thinkers such as George
Herbert Mead, is that the self is intrinsically social or, to follow
Aristotle, political. To the contrary, liberal proponents assert
and assume that the self is autonomous and responsible, unless
incapacitated through age, mental illness or defect.
As people, the republican argument asserts that we are
first constituted by the social and its internalized meanings.
We are born into sex with gender, linguistic, religious and
nationalistic expectations. These constituent aspects of the
individual self flourish, regardless of any asserted personal
autonomy, through internalized cultural reinforcers that
nourish self-formation. Republicanism, for some, makes for a
better fit with this communitarian "insight." Republican
theorists would change institutions and public practices to
accommodate and enhance the self's more "natural"
development along these communal lines. In contrast, liberal
theory rests on the autonomous self as the bedrock of its legal
and political world view. How we get to a republican polity is
certainly as unclear as whether we ever had one, or could have
one in mass societal conditions. Likewise, how can we actualize

a truly liberal state, if such is defined as a state whose purpose
is to provide, as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel insisted, for
the conditions of human flourishing, is equally unclear and
unlikely in current conditions."
The liberal autonomous self is part of a liberal,
mythology, supporting a liberal jurisprudence that, as Roberto
12 For the argument that Hegel held a liberal position and that his position

posited the conditions for individual actualization in an integrated, mediated social
space motivated by a capitalist political economy see SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL'S
THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE (1972).
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Unger argued in Knowledge and Politics, presents but one of
liberalism's antinomies."3 We are all monads negotiating our
arbitrary desires through a rational instrumentalism in a
preference-maximizing and marketing social space. C.B.
MacPherson charted one important narrative of the liberal self
toward a "possessive individualism" and claimed that liberal
capitalism could best be characterized as the end state of that
development. 14 Hence, the republican or communitarian self
would be both more contingent and more generous to
communal concerns. Thus, it seems that the autonomous self of
liberal theory would dictate a different understanding of
individual and social responsibility and, therefore, different
notions of individual and social blame. Except for a defined set
of "worthy" losers-e.g., the nineteenth century's worthy poorall others who lack or need can only blame themselves for their
individual and social inadequacy. 5
A.

CurrentLegal Practiceand IndividualResponsibility

The nature of the self is a significant question for any
jurisprudence, and the extent of any presumptive autonomy or
contingency must be considered in micro or under a more
structural framework, and in legal practice. The legitimacy of
strict liability, negligence and any variations depends on the
basic fit and fairness of the public's intuitions. Criminal
jurisprudence has occupied itself with the insanity defense well
beyond any real world applications, given that the nature of
the self and the attribution of responsibility play out
dramatically in this venue, particularly where the death
penalty hangs as a possible sanction. Focusing on the
individual, whether in a tort or criminal context, tends to
narrow the focus on attribution of fault and blame to one
disposition: Do we charge (blame) the individual economically
or through punishment?
This focus on fault and blame sharpens certain aspects
of our social judgments, which have showed historical variation
if not "progressive" advance. For example, a jury in Wisconsin
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM,

HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
'5 Today, we are seeing at least one tendency in the United States toward a
neo-social Darwinism, in practice if not name, in our attitude toward the poor, where
compassionate conservatism stands for private altruism or charity and undercuts the
state's obligation to the needy.
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deemed human cannibalism legally sane in the Jeffrey Dahmer
case.16 Insanity was not a category that the Wisconsin jury
would affix to Dahmer. The humanizing tendency that David
Bazelon tried and failed to establish with the insanity defense
is well documented.' The defense, never well-liked publicly, is
not the subject of a wide movement for new reform. Yet, in the
tort context, for example, policies like that embodied in the
fellow servant rule have been long since discarded, apparently
as improperly ideologically motivated. Would a thorough-going
republican or communitarian ethos set differing standards for
criminal or tort accountability and blame? Would such a
standard play out differently for questions outside of liability
establishing legal entitlement? These issues are important but
only mentioned here to make the point that such issues are of
concern to legal theorists. 8 In practice, the public experiences
the legal attribution of responsibility in a frame where the
focus is on only one event and the question is one of individual
punishment or fault without a broader context. This focus
domesticates and, at times, distorts possible clarity about social
complicity in any particular enterprise.
16

Dahmer did not appeal his conviction. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Won't File an

Appeal of Verdicts, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 5, 1992, at B6. Two years later, he was
"bludgeoned to death in prison." Don Terry, Jeffrey Dahmer, Multiple Killer, is
Bludgeoned to Death in Prison,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Al. The first year, he was
kept in protective custody but prison officials decided he would be safe in the general
population. Id. I certainly was not surprised that he was murdered in prison.
17 Chief Judge David Bazelon, of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals was
instrumental in persuading the D.C. Circuit to experiment with the application of the
insanity defense. He was the force behind the Durham product test but finally
despaired of ever finding a formulation that would compel a mental health expert to
provide information, but not a conclusion, on the insanity issue. Bazelon was
responsible for an unsuccessful judicial experiment with the application of the -insanity
defense. He wanted to allow psychiatrists to provide as much relevant expertise to the
trier of fact as possible to inform judgment but he did not want to allow such testimony
to substitute for the jury's determination. So psychiatrists were not limited in
testimony except for conclusory statements, sane or insane. See Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The so-called Durham test or product test did not
work, however. Psychiatrists still gave conclusions and sometimes did so because of the
trial court's questions. Bazelon and the D.C. court gave up on the Durham experiment
in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 862, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally DAVID L. BAZELON,
QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW (1988).
18 Dan Kahan's discussion at the "Responsibility
and Blame Symposium"
analyzed criminal jurisprudence, and Tony Sebok's article examines the vicissitudes of
tort theory, responsibility and entitlement. Dan Kahan, The Aesthetics of Blame in
Criminal Law, Remarks at the Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Law,
Language & Cognition Symposium, Responsibility & Blame: Psychological & Legal
Perspectives (Oct. 18, 2002); Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in
American Tort Law, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1031 (2003). Each scholar looks structurally at
the respective jurisprudences and the implications for individual actors.
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Current ideological proponents of tort reform-i.e.,
reducing a plaintiffs rights against manufacturers, doctors,
etc.-emphasize individual responsibility, bad moral luck and
individual burden, and seek to cut back on a structural frame,
in place for over a century, for locating who should bear tort
responsibility
and
burden.
Criminal
responsibility
jurisprudence and even tort accountability have problematic
relationships to the responsibility concerns I address here.
Criminal accountability is binary: guilty or not, sane or not,
competent or not. Tort liability is similar, but it incorporates
economic analysis, which has more to do with the distribution
of loss than an assessment of ethical blame. Neither readily
addresses my question of whether a republican or liberal frame
could set different standards for attributions of accountability
and blame.
A classic political-philosophic
problem concerns
responsibility that differs from the attribution of responsibility
in judicial settings: What does the citizen owe to the polity as
citizen? The apologetics of Socrates exemplify a citizen's
responsibility in the polity, 9 although Socrates eschewed public
responsibility until one was specifically called on in an official
role to respond to a political demand."0 What is the
responsibility of the citizen as citizen rather than as merely a
human, in a world where state sovereignty seems precarious in
a globalized economy and where the complexity of the liberal
state seems to alienate more and more of the populace, who
have become more or less disaffected consumers and not citizen
actors? Human rights, as opposed to civil rights, remain a
significant problem for jurisprudence in the United States (and
in the world generally). Where a contest to preserve civil rights

See PLATO, Socrates Defense (Apology), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES,
INCLUDING THE LETTERS 3 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns trans., 1961).
" Socrates made it very clear in his trial that if he had responded beyond
those times Athenian practice officially called on him, he would not have lasted his
seventy years. See R.E. ALLAN, SOCRATES AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 37 (1980). So the
public/private split in the liberal state did not of itself affect a fragmentation of the
individual's obligation to respond. One could argue that a motivation for Plato's The
Republic was to provide a space for a Socrates to thrive. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, THE
STATESMAN (George Burges trans., 1901). But Socrates would have to be one of the
philosopher kings, or else he would surely perish once again. The Athenian state that
tried and executed Socrates was unlike our liberal, capitalistic state in kind and scale.
Moreover, we must also distinguish the rights and responsibilities of citizens from
human rights and responsibilities. This distinction has significant legal and cultural
consequences regarding current entitlements in the United States and elsewhere.
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is increasingly tense, a more general defense of human rights is
subject to strategic and real sacrifice.
B.

The Responsibility of the Citizen and of Human Beings

This Essay is not concerned with the attribution of fault
in the narrow adjudicative context of torts or criminal law. Nor
do I argue for class entitlement along lines of race, gender or
any other putative deserving set of the population. Rather, my
objective is to analyze a subject more difficult to assess and yet
ultimately no less significant for contemporary jurisprudence:
What does the individual owe to the polity? Asking the
question in this form seems a bit ponderous, portentous, vague
and anachronistic. We do not have a polity in the classic Greek
meaning. Arguably, professionals assume guild or professional
responsibility as a smaller set of social responsibilities.' Max
Weber warned us of the loss of vocation and the undermining of
guild responsibility." He warned us of the loss of spirit that the
iron cages of mass bureaucracies entailed." But even
professionals have experienced a rationalization of their
respective worlds to the point of achieving significant
compensation but a diminishing actual power to run their own
professional lives. From very different political vantage points,
the best of the twentieth century's best literature carried the
same theme. Consider Yeats's "the best lack all conviction,
while the worst/ Are full of passionate intensity"24 as
commentary on the virulent illogic of much of early twentieth
century mass governance. 251
21

See generally, the influential work of Michel Foucault on power and

disciplinary practice, particularly in medicine and more specifically in psychiatry.
Foucault points toward the dispersal of power into disciplines that are governed by
their own immanent institutional needs. For just one of many relevant works, see THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT, STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
Long after his death, Foucault is still giving an edited set of lectures where he takes on
the "history of thought" on parrehesia(free speech and its relationship with frankness,
truth and democracy, inter alia). See MICHEL FOUCAULT, FEARLESS SPEECH (Joseph
Pearson ed., 2001).
12 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 180
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958). Weber's classic diagnosis was that capitalism could well
end with "[sipecialists without spirit, sensualists without heart." The quote continues,
"this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved."
Id. at 182.
23 See MAX WEBER, Science as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 155 (Hans Girth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
21 William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in W.B.
YEATS, THE MAJOR
WORKS (Edward Larrissy ed., 1997).
2' FRANz KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1956).
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Anthony Kronman's Lost Lawyer examines the
corruption of law as a vocation, implicitly asking what is to be
done about the degradation of law's fraternity and the
profession's obligation to the state and community."6 He
analyzes the tension that Kantian liberalism creates for his
neo-Aristotelian valuation of prudence.27 He finds that Kantian
obsessiveness with respect to an idealized individual equality
undermines a more reasonable and ultimately more effective
and just neo-Aristotelian conception. 8 We have lost individual
prudence in the service of structural analysis, particularly to a
variant of economic analysis in the legal academy. 9 Kronman
does not express much optimism for the core of legal practice to
be one based on social obligation." As a legal profession, we
have lost soul and direction. I might add that we also have not
achieved the Kantian respect for the juridical (hypothesized)
individual in juridical or political practice. Theoretical gains
frequently remain theoretical. Kronman writes about the
particular obligation of the bar toward the social good, but the
loss of professional control over its own work extends to
medicine as well."1 Further, the alleged good that lawyerstatesmen did for the state was at best restricted to citizen
rights, most likely making a more general contribution to
governance.
Richard Dagger and others attempt to create a new
synthesis, a liberal republicanism, resolving any conceptual
and real impediment to participatory and engaged politics. 2 We
are not bereft of theory. From John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin
through Michael Sandel and Jean Bethke Elshtain and beyond,
we have identified theoretical issues with some real subtlety.
But just as Plato failed to construct a new state in The
26

See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION (1993). Kronman's description of the day-to-day life of legal practioners
captures something very close to truth. Whether lawyers ever acted to any degree as
the kinds of legal statesmen that he claims is more problematic. For a critique of
Kronman, see AVIRAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995). But see also
Aviram Soifer, Who Took the Awe Out of Law?, in 3 GRAVEN IMAGES: MADNESS,
MELANCHOLY, AND THE LIMITS OF THE SELF at 173 (Andrew D. Weiner & Leonard V.
Kaplan eds., 1976).
17 KRONMAN, supra note 26.
28 Id. at 37-39.
29 Id. at 236-38.
30 Id. at 6-7.
31

Id.

32 RICHARD DAGGER, CmC VIRTUE, RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND REPUBLICAN

LIBERALISM (1997).
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Republic and Laws, we do not live in a world where we can
construct or reconstruct either a Rawlsian neo-liberal
(Kantian) state or a new republic from a theoretical drawing
board.
We are not Greek; we do not have a polity. We have
consumers more than we have citizens. Most of us, including
law professors and political philosophers, do not want or have
the time to act as citizens. Theorizing is not acting as a citizen.
Gregory Vlastos, perhaps the leading student of Socrates,
critiqued even Socrates for his lack of participation as a citizen
of Athens." Vlastos had the war in Vietnam in mind, but the
matter applies generally.34 What is our obligation and what
enforces such an obligation on us as theorists and as human
beings, living in an uncertain, morally ambiguous world? How
do we define or account for individual responsibility to others
or the society outside of dispute resolution or other formalized
state institutions?

II.

BERGMAN'S SHAME

In Shame, Bergman layers the individual, interpersonal
and political, dramatizing the open-ended quandary of
existence for the artist and every person in a contemporary
world in the throes of an unintelligible war, where
commitments are beyond Sartrean absurdity yet choices
nevertheless have consequences for the individual soul and for
the greater community. Every meaning of shame is structured
into the film. Blame is an unvoiced result of living that the
film's narrative demands.
A.

The Film

The film is set during a war. It is unclear whether the
war is civil or between countries. The ambiguity of its setting
bolsters its power and makes the film significant as an object
for analysis of shame and responsibility.3 5 Bergman's film
See Gregory Vlastos, Socratic Studies, in EPILOGUE: SOCRATES AND
VIETNAM 127 (Myles Burnyeat ed., 1994).
33

'

See id. at 132-33.

'5 This very ambiguity counted against Bergman in some critical reviews at
the time of the film's release in Sweden. Maria Bergom-Larson in her book, Ingmar
Bergman and Society details Swedish critical reaction to the film. MARIA BERGOMLARSON, INGMAR BERGMAN AND SOCIETY 99 (Barrie Selman trans., 1978). She also

analyzes the movie and finds it wanting from a left, political viewpoint. She, among
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captures my attention because its very lack of specificity about
the competing sides sets forth a more powerful narrative about
more than war: It portrays the consequences of self-defense
and the avoidance of responsibility in the face of ambiguity,
contingency and horror.
The film opens with Jan and Eva Rosenberg36 awaking
for a new day on an island separated by a short ferry ride from
the mainland." They have been at a small cottage where they
maintain a modest living growing their own food, keeping
chickens and selling berries to the townspeople. For four years,
they have been modestly self-sufficient, away from politics and
a war they and most of the others they encounter seem not to
understand. Viewers are certainly left without a clue
concerning the reasons for the war and the combatants'
competing concerns.
In the first scene, Bergman sets the tone for the first
part of the film by catching the couple waking up."8 Eva, played
by Liv Ullmann, wakes with energy. She performs her morning
ablutions. The more vital member of the couple, she has to
admonish Jan to shave. He seems enervated, passive, listless.
Through the first part of the movie, Eva dictates the responses
for the two. Jan, played by Max von Sydow, is weak, selfpitying, selfish, cowardly and a hypochondriac. He is also most
likely Bergman's reference to himself, the artist contingent on
patronage, a parasite on society on the one hand, a critic on the
other.
We find that the war has been going on for four years
and that the two were musicians. Eva was the first violinist for

others, is critical of Bergman's critical aim in the film. The Swedish left generally saw
the movie as an apology for the United States' involvement in Vietnam. She refers to
Bergman's statement that the script, which he wrote in 1967, would have been
different if written after the escalation in the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia. Id. at 93. But she notes that the ethical status of the war was a
significant issue in Sweden given the war tribunal that Bertram Russell and others
held in 1967 in Stockholm. Id. She says that Bergman himself had ethical qualms
about the movie, not only with respect to the Vietnam issue but also with respect to the
central role of the Soviet Union in its invasion of Czechoslovakia. Id.
36 That the name Rosenberg may strike the observer as Jewish though not
necessarily so has not gone unobserved. It also may be significant that it was the last
name of Julius and Ethel, the infamous couple convicted of espionage during the Red
Scare.
s' Viewers today are aware that there are no island retreats in a globalized
economy and that local wars tend to have broader implications.
38 Bergman, a tough critic of his own work, likes the first scene
of the movie
and stands behind the movie though he would have changed certain scenes on
aesthetic grounds. BERGMAN, supra note 7, at 299-301.
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the state orchestra, which was disbanded because of the war.
Jan seems to be a virtuoso. This assumption is reinforced by
the fact that he possesses a rare, invaluable violin, a Pampini.
Underscoring his expertise, Eva does not know the history of
the violin maker. She may know less about the history of music
and even her own instrument, but she controls their everyday
life. She knows that he has been sexually unfaithful, and this
continues to bother her though she attempts to suppress her
feelings. She knows he is selfish. She may not even like him,
but she says she loves him and makes love with him in an
early, spontaneous scene. She seems to appreciate any positive
attention he gives her.
Bergman shows us another scene from their marriage
with its irritations, minor regrets and cruelties.39 The war at
this stage has changed their lives but not their basic modes of
relating to each other. Eva wants a child and challenges Jan to
be examined by a doctor to see if he is the biological cause of
her failure to get pregnant. Jan is unwilling to see a physician,
not out of a fear of biological deficit, but because he is not
particularly interested in becoming a father. This failure of
generativity emphasizes the extent to which Jan is selfobsessed. It also reveals his unwillingness to reach beyond
himself. His stance in the world seems unrelated to the war.
He would be superior, selfish, unfaithful and self-pitying in any
case. He is bored and does little. He fiddles with the car, which
is always breaking down, and with the radio, which is also
chronically malfunctioning. He fails to pay the phone bill.
When challenged by Eva, his stance is why pay when the phone
does not work anyhow? We can pay our neighbor for any phone
call. When Eva expresses irritation in response, ominously the
dysfunctional phone rings. Eva picks it up, but no one answers.
Despite Eva's general discontent, as in most marriages, there
are moments-particularly early in the movie-when Jan is
seductive and Eva's smile radiates.
Even before the war more immediately intrudes on their
life away from the mainland, we have evidence that Jan is not
maintaining any commitments beyond self-gratification and
survival. His desultory care of his own grooming and mere
tinkering with the car and radio register his disaffection from
39 Bergman's work frequently deals with the theme of marriage and its
potential destructiveness. See for just one example his SCENES FROM A MARRIAGE
(1973).
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any vital commitment. He is not even committed to his art.
Neither he nor Eva practice together or alone any longer. This
is highlighted on the occasion where Jan and Eva meet Jacobi,
the mayor, and his wife on the ferry and reminisce about
playing together, as they had done once, but it is clear to them
all that a new engagement is a hollow commitment.
Before the war violently comes to their doorstep, Jan
presents himself as too sensitive. He cringes on the steps inside
of the house when Eva reminds him to get a jacket before they
leave to deliver berries to the Jacobi household. 4' Eva, who is
presented as vital and compassionate, is obviously disgusted
with what she sees as his hypochondria. In their interactions
he cajoles, don't you like me a little; don't you love me? His
posture is whining, needy, ill-a Woody Allen character
without the humor. His posture works. Despite her disgust,
Eva responds to his seductive moves. When touched, she
smiles. Yet, aware of his adultery and in light of his overall
behavior, she is under no illusion about his basic selfishness.
As presented, the war is not primarily responsible for
much of this behavior. 4' Their art itself is not sustaining or
even important without an audience. They talk as if they will
practice but do not; they plan, after the chance meeting with
the Jacobis, to play a string quartet. This is the talk of an
enervated marriage. Jan does not appear clinically depressed,
which could explain his general disinterest.42 Rather, Jan is a
paradigmatic narcissist and, as such, needs mirroring and
constant affirmation. For him, other people exist only for their
instrumental value. His art seems instrumental and not
worthy in itself. All this changes when-he learns he is capable
of murder. In any event, Jan has no sense of shame or for that
matter guilt. Staying alive, without physical pain, suffices. He
can live with the personal anguish that seems his lot, but the
viewer cannot be sure how deeply his suffering is actually felt.
His suffering does seem postured but even hysterics, after all,
experience suffering though those on the outside find their
behaviors flamboyant, overwrought, histrionic.

40

money.

Eva and Jan deliver berries to the mayor's home to earn subsistence

41 The Rosenbergs' interaction was characterized by many of my female
students, in a recent showing, as typical of married life.
4' Bergman, as clinically aware as any film director, would have
made
depression clear if that were his intent.
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All is not always glum, however. In one of the film's few
delightful scenes, Eva and Jan enjoy fresh fish and wine, talk
about music and discuss Eva's commitment to learn Italian.
But when finally Eva complains about not having a child, Jan
declares himself a determinist. Here, Bergman plays with
philosophy as mere noise. Eva laughs and says that she really
is not interested in philosophy. Jan gets seductive and they fall
under the table together. Bergman's genius is to illuminate
even the dour and to indicate life can yield simple delight.
Their pleasure abruptly changes. The war intrudes and
the film speeds toward a degradation and forlorn doom. An
army attacks and parachutists fall from the sky. A soldier,
suspended from a tree, screams and Eva runs toward the
scream despite Jan's demand that she stay away. She looks at
Jan with contempt. She is impulsively brave. He thinks her
foolhardy. The soldier may need help and Eva will help. The
soldier dies but others arrive demanding to know what
happened. The tension heightens. We see Jan's panic and
cowardice.
A patrol stops at their house and demands that Eva
express her opinion about her political views on camera. She is
frightened, confused and intimidated. She says that she and
Jan are apolitical. She is a musician and they have no
knowledge about what is going on in the war but it has been
going on too long. The patrol challenges her about whether she
believes in democracy. Jan cringes and claims he is sick. The
patrol later doctors the interview and uses it against Jan and
Eva as propaganda. In so doing, Bergman demonstrates the
hypocritical ease with which competing sides can doctor
propaganda by distorting objective reality. Despite the camera
control squad's claim that the Rosenbergs stood for democracy,
the viewer has no reason to differentiate one set of combatants
from the other. Even the uniforms of the competing sides are
without discernible difference.
The war has come home. Another attack and more
bombing prompt Eva and Jan to try to escape, but the road is
out and they are forced home. Before their aborted journey,
Eva suggests they take food. Jan can't bring himself to kill a
chicken. He looks foolish, cartoonish, not like someone who
values life. The scene would be funny if the consequences were
not so serious. The fortunes of war shift. Jan, Eva and others
are rounded up and interrogated. Eva is roughed up but Jan
doesn't go to her aid. Others are more severely hurt and some
killed. We see some of the badly hurt acting stoically whereas
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Jan acts as if he were terribly tortured when he clearly
received little harm.
Jacobi, an acquaintance and the town's mayor, changes
sides from the resistance to become a Quisling.43 Jacobi reveals
to Eva and Jan that they were taken into custody for
propaganda reasons and he knew that their filmed statements
were doctored. Jacobi sends the couple home. He treats the two
with deference where others experience a less kind fate. We
quickly find out that Jacobi has personal motives for his
seeming kindness. Jacobi starts to visit Jan and Eva, bringing
gifts to each. In front of Jan, he tries to seduce Eva. Eva tells
Jan that Jacobi's favoritism is going to bring them retribution
from Filip, a friend who we saw selling freshly caught fish to
Eva. Filip is now clearly the head of the resistance. Filip gives
Eva notice that the resistance does not like the Rosenbergs'
ostensible friendship with Jacobi. Eva looks to Jan for
leadership but finds little help. Their marriage begins to
unravel.
Jacobi's last visit marks a climactic shift in the film.
Jacobi presents Jan with a first edition of DvorAk's Trio in E
Flat. He gives Eva an expensive ring, a family heirloom. When
Eva mentions the fact that his visits are putting them at risk of
attack from the resistance, Jacobi threatens them with
internment in a camp if they refuse his friendship. The three
drink until Jan seems to fall into a stupor from too much wine.
Jacobi tries to pay Eva to have sex with him. He gives her a
wad of money, twenty-three thousand, all his savings.
Jacobi represents middle order, local leadership. He is a
handsome man, generally held in esteem, successful, dignified.
In reality, he is a man who has a wife, a son he has just visited
and a grandson. But his posture in the world is all persona. He
makes clear that he has always had a problem with fellow
feeling. He fears that enemy patrols are going to murder him if
they can find him. He switched sides so he would not be sent
with a gun to fight. Bergman reveals that this man of some
prestige and class is motivated by personal fear and an almost
infantile sexuality. He seems to want mothering from Eva more
than mature sexual satisfaction. He has a sadistic side and a
want of emotional depth, except when he perceives the pain of
others. He is not a pronounced sadist; rather, he is in a position
43 Bergom-Larson refers to Jacobi's Quisling regime evoking the name of the
famous World War II turncoat traitor. See BERGOM-LARSON, supra note 35, at 95-97.
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fraught with personal danger and aggresses on the cowardice
of others, perhaps masking his own. He seems to have lived life
as faqade: his wife, family, community are all surface, all
aesthetics but lacking aesthetic pleasure. Jacobi represents the
"as if'personality, the individual who lives a pretense life, one
motivated by appearance.
Jacobi's seduction of Eva is inept. He reaches for her in
front of a seemingly oblivious Jan and sinks his head into her
breast, a child looking for comfort. She tells him she has never
cheated on Jan, but leads him by the hand to the greenhouse
where they have sex. Compared to the earlier scene with Jan,
this coupling lacks sexual frisson; Eva matter-of-factly resigns,
and Jacobi follows Eva passively. The money is left on the
table. Jan awakens, grasps what has happened and puts the
money in his pocket. No sooner do Jacobi and Eva come back to
the house than Filip and a patrol arrive. They grab Jacobi, who
tries to buy his freedom with the money he has given to Eva.
Eva demands the money from Jan; he disavows
knowledge of the money. Filip orders his crew to search the
house. They rip apart the house, destroying everything,
including the rare Pampini violin. The irreplaceable violin is
worth more than the thousands Jan is secreting. When it
becomes clear that the money is not forthcoming, Filip puts his
arm around Jacobi, a comrade he knows is about to be
executed. Filip hands the gun to Jan to execute Jacobi. Jan at
first drops the gun and then picks it up in a replay of the
pantomime with the chicken that he could not kill. Finally, he
awkwardly fires at Jacobi, hits him and then chases him
around a wagon where he shoots him again. A soldier then uses
an automatic weapon and finishes the job, but that shooting
seems gratuitous. Jan killed Jacobi.
Jan changes. He is now toughened. He will live. He does
not seem traumatized but rather determined." When Eva says
she will not go with him, he tells her that her absence will
make his opportunities easier. She follows. But I think, in fact,
despite her strength and palpable humanity, Jan has always
been in control in the relationship. He has the control of the
suffering one as well as the virtuoso husband who has been the

44 He is not an example of the beserker that Jonathan Shay exemplarily
describes in his excellent analysis of war trauma that relates Homer's Achilles to
Vietnam War veterans suffering post traumatic stress disorder. See JONATHAN SHAY,

ACHILLES IN VIETNAM, COMBAT TRAUMA AND THE UNDOING OF CHARACTER (1994).
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object of desire of other women. Eva looked toward him to no
avail. Now he is in command.
On the road, they encounter an exhausted young
soldier, Johan. Eva makes Johan feel comfortable. He falls
asleep, but Jan grabs Johan's rifle, awakens him and chases
the terrified boy down the road. Jan returns with Johan's boots
and information about a boat that will be leaving the next
morning. Jan killed the boy, but not for the boy's boots. He
could have had them anyway.
Filip, who replicates Jacobi in seemingly changing
character, is the boat's captain. With some irony, Filip accepts
Eva and Jan as passengers. When Jan approaches Filip for
passage away from the war, he does not bother to negotiate
price. He offers the whole of the twenty-three thousand of
Jacobi's "gift" to Eva. Although unstated in the film, the script
specifies that the boat is on the water seven days. The world
may have been created in seven days, but there is no creativity
on this boat as its inhabitants either struggle to stay alive or
resignedly give up. To the viewer, the horror is
undifferentiated. At an early point on this death voyage, Filip
lifts himself over the side and commits suicide. We do not know
if this was always Filip's intention.
Jan, however, struggles for survival and nothing more.
His life is revealed as having survival and little more as his
principal motivation. At one point, the boat is hindered by the
bodies of dead soldiers. With grim determination, Jan plows
through the bodies, moving them aside with an oar. Jan killed
Jacobi to save his own life. He had good reason to believe that
Filip would kill him if he did not kill Jacobi. He kills to protect
himself. But he killed Johan for no good reason. When Filip
goes over the side of the boat, Jan seems unconcerned. He pays
little attention to Eva and her needs, as he paid no real
attention to her desire for a child. More than anyone, he keeps
up the struggle on the boat, fighting through the dead bodies.
Yet, he does not reach out to respond to anyone beyond his own
need.45 Though he is now a murderer and has lost his music, he
seems more ruthless and in command. He has no guilt or
" Emmanuel Levinas would point out that Jan's incapacity to respond to
another limits the meaning of his own life. See, e.g., EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ETHICS AND
INFINITY; CONVERSATIONS WITH PHILIPPE NEMO 65-72 (Richard A. Cohen trans., 1985)
[hereinafter ETHICS AND INFINITY] (noting where Levinas talks about relating to the

feminine and also to paternity; in each case the self must reach toward the mystery of
the other and yet remain self).
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shame. These are irrelevant behaviors. Nor is this state a
consequence of war.
The film ends with the survivors at sea, rudderless,
with a watery horizon, seemingly out of food and water. Where
horizon can mean openness, freedom, here the implication is a
desert of inhuman, endless despair. Where water symbolizes
life in Bergman's Virgin Spring,4" here it represents a
meaningless, inescapable death. Jan has negotiated himself to
a loss of meaning and caused loss of life. Eva is left with a
dream of an infant and the intimation that Jan would "tell me
the important thing that I had forgotten."47
B.

Theological Implications of Shame

In the 1960s, the then most famous scholar of the
Frankfurt school in the United States, Herbert Marcuse,
wrestled with the possibilities of emancipation from a onedimensional society, a society so bureaucratically rationalized
that there was little escape from futile consumer-deluded
46

Virgin Spring was released in 1960. Sven Nykvist was the director of

photography.
47 The script is not quite so bleak in the final interaction between Jan and
Eva. In the script's ending, on the sixth day Jan turns to Eva, "wondering what it said
in those letters we wrote to each other during the summer tour. Whether it said 'My
hand in yours' or 'Your hand in mine.'" Eva answers "it said 'My hand in yours.'" See
INGMAR BERGMAN, PERSONA AND SHAME, THE SCREEN PLAYS OF INGMAR BERGMAN 191
(Keith Bradfield trans., 1972). The last instruction on the script states in italics: "On
the seventh day a storm blows up, and there is a heavy rain. The survivors slake their
thirst with poisoned water." Id.
The film generally presents a bleaker view than the script. Bergom-Larson
observes Bergman's different use of class in the script. BERGOM-LARSON, supra note 35,
at 97. In the script, a scene near the end of the movie has a tank pointing toward the
fleeing boat, calling out the names of the upper class occupants of the small boat trying
to escape the war. Several of the escapees are called out by name, but Jan and Eva are
not even mentioned. In the script, Jan demands why their names are not called with
the others who are upper class and have been corrupt. The implication is they lack
importance. But Bergman dropped this scene and its Marxist message from the film.
Bergom-Larson takes the position that the vagueness of the competing sides in the
war, and the compassion for Jacobi, who she understands to be only a torturer,
sentimentalizes the movie and removes the moral gravitas against an unjust war and
against injustice itself in a more general apolitical attack on human violence. Id. at 9596. Bergman fails in his quest to show the relationship between inner and outer
violence because "it lacks any social or political contours." Id. at 101.
Another example of a change from the script to the film itself is the action
around the boy Johan, the young soldier who deserted the war. The script makes Jan's
motivation for killing him something more than gratuitous. Jan and Eva kill him to
take his place on the boat escaping the island and the war. But in the movie, Johan
knows about the boat's prospective leaving, but he has no reserved place and it is not
clear that he had the money to get on the boat. Jan claims to shoot him for his boots in
the film, but that seems a rationalization for a new indifference in Jan concerning
murder.
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seduction. Even before his One Dimensional Man," Marcuse
argued in a debate with Norman 0. Brown that only a change
in capitalistic culture could free the individual from
enmeshment in a soporific society dedicated to tepid self
gratification.4 9 With a real loss of the essence of polymorphic
perversity, Marcuse found, contra Freud himself, in Freud's
insights. ° For Marcuse, only a cultural revolution would free
the individual from a deadening society;5' Brown saw the
possibility of individual salvation.52
In his own terms, Bergman sets forth a similar
quandary. Can the individual escape from a culture whose
violence threatens to destroy him physically as well as
psychologically? Is there a relationship between individual
salvation and ethical obligation? How and why commit to a side
when the various sides are equally ideological, sanctimonious
and corrupt?
Bergman does more than merely culturally relativize
violence and equate moral social ambiguity with a rationale to
escape responsibility. He makes clear the cost of avoidance,
even if he does not solve the institutional question any more
than did Plato or Marcuse.5 3 The war for Bergman is real but,
whatever his qualms, the moral questions in the war's
ambiguity are strengthened and universalized beyond
Vietnam. 4 So what does Bergman present? How plausible is
his representation of the ethical,55 and what does he point to as
4" HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN
THE IDEOLOGY OF
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964).
49 The debate was published in HERBERT MARCUSE, NEGATIONS
(Jeremy J.

Shapiro trans., 1968) (containing Marcuse's essay Love Mystified: A Critiqueof Norman
0. Brown and A Reply to HerbertMarcuse by Norman 0. Brown). Brown's first attempt
to appropriate Freud for individual salvation was LIFE AGAINST DEATH, THE
PSYCHOANALYTICAL

MEANING

OF HISTORY

(1959).

Brown's

LOVE'S

BODY

(1966)

prompted Marcuse's critique and his response.
" See HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION, A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY INTO FREUD (1955) [hereinafter EROS AND CILIZATION] (arguing how Freud

can be appropriated for social liberation at the political level). Marcuse carries his
cultural analysis along in One Dimensional Man. See supra note 48.
See MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 50.
52 BROWN, LOVE'S BODY, supra note 49.

53 Julia Annas persuasively argues that Plato is more successful
in arguing

for the possibility of a man being just despite a corrupt society than Plato was in
drawing up the foundations for a just state. See JULIA ANNAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PLATO'S REPUBLIC (1981). See also JULIA ANNAS, PLATONIC ETHICS, OLD AND NEW

(1999).

"' See supra note 35.
Emmanuel Levinas would later posit that the ethical is prior to
ontology.

55

See, e.g., EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY (Alphonso Lingis trans., 1979);
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any way out for the cowardly, befuddled Jan and his dependent
wife Eva Rosenberg?56 In fact, I argue that no one in the film
escapes the loss of self and soul as they work through their
respective roles in the narrative. At best, the resistance leader
Filip, at first blush, seems to possess a quiet dignity. The
torturer, interrogator and Quisling, Jacobi, also seems to
possess a human dignity when confronted with certain death.
But does either possess an ethical dignity rather than the
aesthetic choice Soren Kierkegaard identifies in his opposition
of the "either" of the ethical to the "or" of the aesthetic?57
Martha Nussbaum argues for the continued relevance of
Hellenistic philosophy for contemporary edification.5 8 The
Epicureans, Stoics and Skeptics all shared an understanding of
the corruption in the politics of their times. She argues these
schools differed on the individual's ethical obligation against
widespread social corruption. She counsels a reasoned
modification of attitudes on coveting unnecessary material
objects.5" Happiness and psychological health depended on
calibrating desire to the necessary or natural, not to socially
induced, artificial need. Jan and Eva certainly acted in accord
with this wisdom. They separated themselves and reduced
their desires to human maintenance. But they could not
thereby escape the shame that the dominant political forces
visited on them. In declaring the self a non-political person,
Bergman clarified that, like Aristotle, he understood that
humanity is essentially political. Shame exemplifies the
essentially social nature of beings, no matter what the social
construction of the self might be.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer argued in his Ethics, written while
in prison, that human responsibility sometimes entails
transgressing the laws of man and God.65 We owe an obligation,
a response to the other in need. And we must put ourselves on
the line, whatever the prevailing ethics. In fact, Bonhoeffer,
citing the exile from Eden, argued that Western ethics itself
has been a defense of narcissistic, sanctimonious deceit. We are

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR, BEYOND ESSENCE (Alphonso Lingis

trans., 1991).
56 See supra note 36.
57 See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, EITHER/OR (David Swenson et al. trans., 1944).
5' MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
HELLENISTIC ETHICS (1994).
59 Id. at 501.

60 See supra note 8.
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estranged from God and wish through ethical rationalization to
assuage our self-esteem by ethical nicety. Nietzsche, not Kant,
was the philosopher against whom Bonhoeffer measures his
analysis. For Bonhoeffer, the particularity of the others' need,
not a universalized imperative, dictates responsible action.
But Bonhoeffer tempered his demands on the
individual. He posed three mandates that command fidelity:
state, family and church. As a Lutheran minister, he remained
an authoritarian. 61 But at moments of breakdown, when at the
abyss, the individual must respond despite the empirical
reality of the mandates, and incur whatever guilt necessary on
behalf of another. His position, however, was not one of passive
witness or civil obedience when the situation commanded
response. But the situations at the edge are not everyday. They
are limited to the kind of breakdown the Nazi thrust
exemplified. Bonhoeffer eschewed the possibility of a rulebound ethics, Kantian or otherwise.6 2 He could not, however,
state when one should respond beyond the mandates and
transgress for the other. He thought such states were
necessarily atypical; we should all remain bound to Caesar, the
family and the Church." In this he followed Luther, who
himself followed Augustine and ultimately Paul, who called
forth an ethos that grounded obligation in the city of Caesar
and hope in the city of God.64
The predicate for Bergman's Shame, however, is a state
of war.65 War is the situation wherein Bonhoeffer felt compelled
to reach beyond institutional structure. War has been seen as a
deviant case, one where normal civility falls apart. Deviant
cases mark and define the normal. But the conditions of the
war in Shame do not reach its players except as a backdrop of
anxiety. Only when the war actually comes to their very
doorstep do we see a significant change in their respective
characters; they move to the island to escape the war, but
otherwise they remain the same. Further, the shift to war,
6 NUSSBAUM, supra note 58, at 330-31.
62 Id.

at 86.

0 Id. at 204-10.
'

Id. at 95-97.

65 At a time of war against Iraq by the United States, Vietnam is old, musty

news to most Americans. In retrospect, we did not have a chance to win the war in
Vietnam by the logic of our own engagement. I am not arguing that there are no just
wars and times when fighting may be justified. Nor am I commenting on Iraq. Rather,
my point is that many wars present ambiguous justification, a lack of clarification of
goals and dubious communal support.
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while extreme, is part of a continuum in the movie,
problematizing the boundaries of Bonhoeffer's authority
structures.
Who can determine when the abyss is present, when
action demands transgression? Bonhoeffer's inbred, Lutheran,
authoritarian bias may be unhelpful for those who fail to
respond to such internal Protestant constraints. And individual
:transgression may be justified on Bonhoeffer's own grounds.
qJan and Eva Rosenberg tried to opt out of a war but were not
, allowed to. The war came home. We cannot say whether the
,war changes the Rosenbergs. Does it bring out what is latent or
does it effect structural, characterological alteration through
terror or trauma? What is within their respective compasses,
and what must be understood as bad moral luck? These are
*among the classical questions clustered in discussions of
responsibility.
-C.

The Elision of Shame and Guilt

Levinas maintains that everyone owes an asymptotic
responsibility to the other, stranger or intimate.6 6 As in
Bonhoeffer's view, this responsibility is ethical, called forth by
the face of the other and not limited to any natural, i.e.,
ontological mandates. Levinas deems it essential for one to
possess awareness of shame. None of the characters in Shame
understand this position-to their shame. In the film's
interactions there is not any sense of shame. The Rosenbergs
tried to avoid the war and any commitment to a life beyond
themselves.
Jan and Eva change indeed but viewers may differ on
the reasons for, and their personal control over, the changes. If
Jan is the narcissist, locked into himself and survival at all
costs, Eva, alternatively, is a lovely, vibrant, compassionate
human being. But she is dependent on Jan. For Levinas, this
would in some ways be an ethical strength in that Eva
understands her need for the other, in this case Jan. But
Levinas understands that responsiveness to the other must
occur at a certain level of human development. Understanding,
and responding to, the other becomes meaningful only when a
certain security in the self is achieved, a certain level of
See, e.g., EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TIME AND THE OTHER 110-16 (Richard
6
Cohen trans., 1987).
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narcissism. For Levinas, one must reach a certain level of
autonomy to appreciate that an autonomous state is
insufficient for psychological development and a recognition of
the obligation of responsibility to the other. 7 A reaching out to
the other without a prior sense of self does not mark the ethical
attainment of responsible action. Nevertheless, one must credit
Eva; her first response is toward others-the parachutist who
is part of the attack on the island and Johan, the boy soldier
trying to flee the war. She even seems to respond to Jacobi,
moving beyond her fear of him, because he appeals to her
nurturing tendencies, certainly not because of his gifts. She
may also have responded to Jacobi out of disgust at Jan.
Levinas's "difficult freedom" demands an adult developmental
attainment. 6 Eva's impulses are a necessary but insufficient
reaching out of herself. Ultimately, she remains in thrall to
Jan, who, as usual, is not there for her.
In what way does Eva express a face of shame, a lack of
responsiveness? Bergman indicates no harsh judgment toward
Eva. Indeed, Bergman makes even Jan human. This is his very
point. Eva's incapacity may be her strength. She is committed
to Jan and her marriage even in the face of his cowardice at the
beginning of the film and, later, in her despondent passivity
toward him in the face of his brutality. Ultimately, however,
her impulses are more human, responsive and attractive than
Jan's.
Would her "being in the world" present a problem for
Levinas's philosophy? He would understand her reaching out
and her impulse toward caring for the other, even the stranger
in need.69 He would be less judgmental than Bergman. He
would point out that Eva's incapacity to follow through
effectively on her humane impulses hurt and infantalize her.7 °
The war, an extreme state, reveals her implicit regard for
others. It also reveals her ultimate dependency on Jan. She
may well have stayed with him had there been no war, more
adiultery and no children.
67 See LEVINAS, ETHICS AND INFINITY, supra note 45,
at 52.
'8 See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, DIFFICULT FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON JUDAISM 11-23

(Sean Hand trans., 1990).
69 See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, Toward the Other, in NINE TALMUDIC READINGS

12-29 (Annette Aronoiwicz trans., 1990).
70 Id.
In Nine Talmudic Readings Levinas indicates his understanding of the
difficulty of forgiving, in his case Heidegger. His work and ethos call for compassion
and a recognition of the difficulty of becoming separate and then responding to the
other.
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Jacobi, Filip and Lobelius, the antique dealer, must be
accounted for as well.7 Jacobi, the mayor turned enemy
Quisling, presents himself as a man who feels little except
during the pain of others, despite his seeming sense of dignity.7"
He preys on Jan to reach Eva, who sees through him but is
certainly resigned and afraid. In his attempt to seduce Eva in
front of Jan, he says he is lonely and alienated. "Eva give me a
kiss. Jan won't mind." Jacobi's character is perhaps the
significant, explicit attack on the artist society's parasitic
nature and lack of responsibility, a general theme for Bergman.
Jacobi has a wife, a son and a grandson; yet he gives the
family's heirlooms away. Eva certainly is attractive, but Jacobi
does not seem a passionate man; his approach to her expresses
a kind of need for intimacy. Perhaps he is a sadist, one who
gets sexual pleasure from the suffering of others, both Jan and
Eva. But Bergman presents him with sympathy as well. He
dies well, too. He is a man who expresses authority, dignity
and familial responsibility but ultimately lives a lie. The war
brings out, but does not cause, his response. The war reveals
that he has no sense of shame and that the responsibility he
previously exemplified was a misrepresentation. His behavior
did not make him grow or take him outside himself toward any
other.
Filip, at first blush, provides the model for responsible,
committed action. A contrast to Jacobi, he seems to keep the
faith. At the beginning of the film, we first encounter Filip as a
pastoral fisherman who sells fish to Eva when she and Jan are
on their way to deliver berries. We later learn that he is the
leader of the resistance. He seems a man of dignity, justice and
commitment. When Jacobi presses his friendship on the
Rosenbergs primarily to get to Eva, Filip warns Eva and Jan to
avoid Jacobi. When Jacobi offers a trapped Filip his life for
money to continue the resistance, the viewer, and more
importantly Filip, seems to take him at his word. He will honor
the deal. He does kill Jacobi-a turncoat-but only when
Jacobi cannot recover the money he gave Eva. Bergman never
makes clear what Filip or the others fought for. At the very end
Filip wavers. He captains the escaping boat, but his true intent
is murky until he eases himself over the side to a watery grave.
71

See supra note 73 and accompanying text. A few other characters who are

tortured show courage and care but they are supplementary, serving to highlight Jan's
deficits.
72 BERGOM-LARSSON, supra note 35,
at 96.
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His resignation is not without dignity, but he abandons the
refugees who paid him to escape. While Bergman seems to
sympathize with Filip's choice, he undercuts the most
committed character in the film. He leaves viewers with
another betrayal, a lack of shame in the face of a resigned
death.
Bergman provides other reflections relevant to shame
and responsibility in capturing the Rosenbergs' social relations.
For example, there is a scene where Jan and Eva, having
earned more money than expected selling their berries to the
Jacobis, buy a good bottle of wine from Lobelius, the musty
antique shop keeper.73 Lobelius appears in an old uniform. He
has been drafted. An elderly man, he worries that he will be
sent to fight and no one will miss him. His cleaning woman will
look after the shop, but even she, with whom he sleeps once a
week, will not miss him. Lobelius shares a bottle of fine wine
with Eva and Jan and sells them one of his last bottles to go
with Filip's fish. He also shows them a fine antique Meissen
porcelain music box. Eva and Jan express a perfunctory
sympathy. That they meet the scene, with its aged objects from
a dead past and old antique dealer, with merely conventional
concern leaves a sense of melancholy and failed community.
Jan and Eva want to leave, to eat their fish and drink their
wine. They leave Lobelius confused, afraid and alone.
Shame as an emotion can mean humiliation.7 4 But
Shame also represents the sense that the characters and the
culture that produced them are shameful, worthy of blame.
Here, the long debated relationship between shame societies
and guilt societies arises. 5 The issues go to individual
attributions. How does shame differ from guilt? If there are
differences in the two terms, how do they affect our
understanding of responsibility? Bergman's characters seem
locked into the shameful. They express no sense of guilt. But it
is not clear whether shame is a felt emotion, as opposed to a
cultural structure and behavior, regardless of felt emotion.
When I interviewed for admission to study at The
Institute for Psychoanalysis, Gerhard Piers asked how I would
73 The script for the film indicates that the shop is filled with "objects
(vain,
meaningless, fragile, ugly, indispensable)." BERGMAN, supra note 47, at 120.
74 This is certainly a theme, perhaps the significant theme, in Bergman's
film
work. See LIVINGSTON, supra note 7.
75 See GERHARD PIERS & MILTON B. SINGER, SHAME AND GUILT,
A
PSYCHOANALYTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY (1971).
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differentiate between shame and guilt. I told him that guilt
referred to an act. One conceivably could pay for the act
through punishment or be granted forgiveness. Shame was an
attack on one's being regardless of a particular act. Bernard
Williams's noted study holds that guilt results from an
internalization where the internalized imago is anger and the
subjective feeling is fear.76 Shame, according to Williams, arises
from the humiliation of being watched and found lacking."
Piers told me that he used to think along the lines I suggested,
which accorded with Williams's view, but came to the position
that the two states could probably not be differentiated. While
wandering through a bookstore after my interview with Piers, I
found a copy of Piers and Singer's Shame and Guilt." Piers
never mentioned his theoretical contribution to the distinction.
Psychoanalysis still has much to teach about the intrapsychic organization of the individual patient, including the
shame/guilt differentiation. It also may be suggestive of the
ways in which culture helps shape the internalized world.
Bergman, however, makes the case that shame reveals more
about social and individual denial or, even more significantly, a
failure of a social imperative of responsibility to the other. In
the world of Shame, neither guilt nor shame prompts any
significant character toward responsible action. Talking about
a guilt or shame culture is not relevant to the motivation of the
film's characters. Piers observed the way in which shame and
guilt are intra-psychically confounded or not differentiated,
picking up on a culture of narcissistic inwardness where
success is counted in materiality and appearance, and where
tending one's own garden is the exemplary ethos. Bergman
shows us a world where guilt and shame ceased to affect
human response. He shows us a set of consequences where
such emotions no longer motivate.

76 BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY
(1993).
77 See id. at 220.

[T]he root of shame lies not so much in observed nakedness itself, but in
something of which that is, in most cultures, but not all, a powerful
expression.... The root of shame lies in exposure in a more general sense, in
being at a disadvantage: in what I shall call, in a very general phrase, a loss
of power. The sense of shame is a reaction of the subject to the consciousness
of this loss: . . . "it is the emotion of self-protection."
Id. (quoting Gabrielle Taylor's phrase).
78 See PIERS & SINGER, supra note 75.
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Paisley Livingston argues against those who view
Bergman's often bleak cinematic worlds as nihilistic.7 9
Livingston urges that Bergman presents our world to us for an
assessment of our actions (and inactions), for consideration of
how any change or transformation may be possible, if even
called for." Bergman, that is, is bearing witness. From this
perspective, a set of questions arise from Shame. What is
Bergman showing us about basic human relationships (1)
between the self and the self, and (2) between the self and
significant others, the self and more generalized sociality, and
the self and the institutions that constitute the formal and
informal modes of governance?
III.

JERUSALEM

AND

APPROPRIATION

ATHENS:

THE

THEOLOGICAL

OF PHILOSOPHY FOR AN ETHICS OF

RESPONSIBILITY

A.

Levinas and the Ethical Over the Ontological

The individual psychology of the characters in Shame
affirms the ethical position of Emmanuel Levinas."1 Levinas
follows in a long line of philosophers who sought to bring
philosophy into the service of theological concerns, bringing the
tools of Athens under the revelatory dictates of Jerusalem. 2
Perhaps more than any other philosopher, Levinas makes the
argument for what he calls a scandalous position: that ethics
precedes ontology.83 Levinas means that an individual cannot
See LIVINGSTON, supra note 7, at 15-21.
80 Id. at 20.
79

" I examined the work of Levinas on responsibility and law elsewhere, so I
will summarize my views. See Leonard V. Kaplan, Intentional Agency, Responsibility
and Justice, in INTENTIONS AND INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION
(Bertram Malle et al. eds., 2001). From his first recognition, for his translation of
Heidegger's Being and Time and his footnoted place as Jacques Derrida's teacher,
Levinas, even before his death, gained recognition as a significant philosopher in his
own right, engendering a still growing critical commentary.
82 I should make clear that the Islamic thinkers Averroes and Avecinna made
Aristotle available to the Jewish philosopher Maimonides, who, in turn, was read by
the Christian Alfred and Alfred's student St. Thomas Aquinas. In the ninth century,
before Maimonides, the Jewish theologian Saadia Gaon brought philosophy to Jewish
thought. Of course, even early in the first century, the Jewish philosopher Philo, who
was more influential on Christian than Jewish thought, had already incorporated
Greek philosophy into his thinking about Jewish theology.
83

See, e.g., LEVINAS, NINE TALMUDIC READINGS, supra note 69; LEVINAS,

ETHICS AND INFINITY, supra note 45 (containing an influential interview with the
philosopher Philippe Nemo).
Arguably, and truly from Levinas' point of view, he shares his position with
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achieve any real personhood without making the ethical
central to personal development. Without the primacy of the
ethical we are lost as individuals. For Heidegger, ontology
culminated in the authenticity of the Nazi regime. s4 The logic of
authenticity and the care of ontology fundamental to
Heideggerean
philosophy demanded universalizing the
particular (Nazi racial theory) into an all-encompassing being
for the other who was now in concert with yourself.85
Heideggerean ontology, from Levinas's point of view, celebrates
sameness, not the particularity that an individual soul brings
to existence. 6
In historical terms, Heidegger was able to prefer as the
universal class of existence the peasant class with its
conservative tendency toward the authoritarian, a class that
ironically tamed existence into a sameness that ultimately
privileged Nazi mechanization. The necessity of recognizing the
particularity of an individual soul grounds Levinas's ethics of
responsibility with respect to what is owed the other and the
third. Further, by demanding that the ethical precedes
ontology, Levinas also attacks any idealization or idolatry of
theory or practice. 87 He attacks any theoretical or practical
totalization where the individual is lost to a greater entity.
This even includes the state, itself a precarious third for the
pragmatics of justice. The third marks the position of
institutions and justice in Levinas's account of his prophetic
one of the most quoted and perhaps least read of twentieth century Jewish thinkers,
Franz

Rosenzweig. See, e.g., ROBERT GIBB,

CORRELATIONS IN ROSENZWEIG AND

LEVINAS (1992). Levinas acknowledges his debt to Rosenzweig often. See, e.g., LEVINAS,
ETHICS AND INFINITY, supra note 45, at 78; STEPHANE MOSES, SYSTEM AND
REVELATION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANZ ROSENZWEIG (Catherine Tihanyi trans., 1992).
See, LEVINAS, ETHICS AND INFINITY, supra note 45, at 100-01. See also
ETHICS

AS FIRST PHILOSOPHY,

THE SIGNIFICANCE

OF EMMANUEL

LEVINAS FOR

PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, AND RELIGION (Adrianne T. Peperzak ed., 1995). The notion
of ethics as first philosophy is that ethics makes the humanity human. Fabio
Ciaramelli captures Levinas's struggle to get at the concrete experience of ethical
responsibility and the necessity thereby to go beyond (prior) to the language of
ontology. See Fabio Ciaramelli, Levinas's Ethical Discourse Between Individuation and
Universality, in RE-READING LEVINAS 81-105 (Robert Bernasconi & Simon Critchley
eds., 1991).
85 For an important analysis of Levinas's political philosophy, see HOWARD
CAYGILL, LEVINAS AND THE POLITICAL (2002).
Levinas is concerned with the way in which Heidegger, particularly in his
later work, moves away from particularity of the individual's concrete being and
responsibility to an abstracted concept of existence. See, e.g., LEVINAS, ETHICS AND
INFINITY, supra note 45, at 40-44.
87 EMMANUEL LEVINAS, IN THE TIME OF THE NATIONS
55-75 (Michael B.
Smith trans., 1994).
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politics-but a precarious and often unreliable third. Justice
for Levinas precariously partakes of an overlapping of ontology
and ethics. The state may be a necessary institution to ground
justice but it also often reifies into an oppressor itself.
Ultimately, in his prophetic politics Levinas also ratifies Plato's
insight that justice can and sometimes only lies in the just
person who can and must resist institutional oppression.
Levinas differs from Bonhoeffer in his historical
judgment that existence is always either in the market place or
at war.88 Peace is precarious and the state cannot be trusted as
the guarantor of justice. Bonhoeffer seems to argue that the
state, though flawed as a divine mandate, is generally good
enough for human deferment.89 In Shame, Bergman exemplifies
the borderland between Levinas and Bonhoeffer.
Bergman did not intend the kind of apology for war like
the thinker Carl Schmitt's philosophy reflected. Schmitt's
liberalism was both soft with no meritorious telos and too
strong; it weakened the human spirit, which required the agon
of struggle (side against side) to create human meaning. °
Bergman's poetic, in fact, is beyond a governmental
configuration. Whatever informs the competing sides does not
justify the war's violence.
Levinas, a Jew, and Bonhoeffer, a Protestant, each
wrote in the face of World War II. Each generalized notions of
responsibility informed by that struggle to something more
universal. A Czech thinker, Jan Patocka, also starts from
Edmund Husserl and Heidegger as does Levinas. Patocka
incorporates Christian, likely Catholic, theology into the center
of an analysis of human history and of a responsibility that is
necessary to the struggle against the nihilism engendered by
the Nazi experience. 91 To what extent do we need historical
m See LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY, supra note 55, at 233 (stating
Levinas's position that market relations and war are constant, though commerce is a
better state than war). See CAYGILL, supra note 85, at 94-107. For Bonhoeffer the state
is "a restrainer," a "force for order" one of the mandates that express God's will for
humanity's good. See BONHOEFFER, supra note 8, at 55.
89 Bonhoeffer remains a good Lutheran except at times of extraordinary
crisis, given his commitment to the Lutheran world view of the two kingdoms, one of
God and one of Man, each of which has his place and must be obeyed. See
BONHOEFFER, supra note 8, at 55.
90 For one solid presentation and criticism in the literature concerning
Schmitt's critique of liberalism, his ties to the Nazi regime and his place in liberalism's
right wing enemies, see WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT: THE END OF LAW
(1999).
9' Like Bonhoeffer, Patocka gave his life resisting an evil regime. He was
the
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specificity to ground responsibility and to affect character
responses through shame, guilt or some other mechanism to
care for others? Is the debate about republican or liberal forms
of governance instructive toward creating more responsible
subjectivities? Patocka provides historical analysis toward a
history of actualized responsibility, one that fruitfully contrasts
with Bonhoeffer and Levinas. Patocka furthers Bergman's
representation of the war and shame as silencing responsibility
as human institutional and everyday practice.
B.

Patockaand the Relationship of the MaterialBase to
Responsibility

Patocka, like Bonhoeffer, was the victim of a repressive
regime.92 He was not allowed to teach or publish in
Czechoslovakia because he was antagonistic to its totalitarian
brutality.9" He became a leader of the dissent and was
ultimately killed at the hands of the police during forced
interrogations. Only now is his work being translated into
English and becoming widely known.94
Patocka was a student of Husserl and Heidegger and
had command of their respective work. Heidegger is very much
in the background of Patocka's essay on European decadence.95
Heidegger's notion of authenticity is thematic to the analysis.
The Heideggerian attempt to capture human existence and
ontology relies on the notion that only when the self confronts
death can it live an authentic life. The function of true
philosophy is to teach how life can be so lived. In short, there is
a right and a wrong way to live. Following Heidegger, Patocka
fears that Western civilization through technology veered
toward decadence and the inauthentic.9 6 Since the rise of
capitalism, various thinkers of left, right and center feared the
extent to which technology could so dominate consciousness as
spokesman for the Charter 77 movement that demanded, in 1977, that the Czech
government adhere to universal human rights commitments. His exhaustive
interrogation by the police cost him his life before his seventieth birthday. See JAN
PATOCKA, HERETICAL ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 161 n.2 (James Dodd ed.,
Erazim Kohdk trans., 1996) [hereinafter HERETICAL ESSAYS].
9 Id. at vii.
93 Id. at vi.
See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH 1-34 (David Wills trans., 1995)
(commenting on Patocka's essay, Is Technological Civilization Decadent, and Why?, in
HERETICAL ESSAYS, supra note 91, at 95).
95 PATOCKA, supra note 91, at 95.
96 id.
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to undercut self-awareness and human awe at the mysteries of
existence, without, however, coming to theological speculation.
Patocka has the credentials that Heidegger sorely
lacked on his biographical commitments to responsible and just
action. Like Bonhoeffer, Patocka grounds his analysis on the
essential nature and the possible development of Christian
theology. He is both deeply Christian and critical of the
Christian practice of responsibility in Europe.97 He contends
that Christianity has for a long time informed and dominated
the metaphysics of responsibility in Europe." He claims that
Christian influence dominated and subsumed the Greek model
that prevailed in the West to motivate and rationalize
responsibility."
Patocka's analysis uses Plato's Greek model with
respect to the unification of thought toward a general,
overarching, integrative good. Lenn Goodman, in his recent
God of Abraham, argues that Jerusalem and Athens share the
common genius of organizing meaning into an integrative quest
for the good, and that pluralism can contribute to more subtle
and nuanced elaborations for determining the human good.'00
Patocka, however, in his genealogy of good to God, Greek to
Christian, differentiates very different stances in the world
predicated on Greek good or Christian God.'0 '
Patocka asserts the triumph of the Christian over the
Greek in the metaphysics of responsibility, not as a sectarian
matter, but as historical fact. Bernard Yack noted that
postmodern discourse notwithstanding, certain traditions have
maintained themselves through history through uninterrupted
argumentation, clarification, commentary and the like. 02
Patocka takes the view that the Christian model has been
ideologically dominant for the West since its elaboration.
Derrida is convinced by Patocka's assertion that Western
responsibility, or at least European responsibility, is
Christian. 0 3 (This claim does not mean that there are not other
competing, lower visibility traditions like Judaism and Islam.)
97 Id. at 95-108.
98

Id. at 107-18.

99 Id. at 106-07.

1o0L.E. GOODMAN, GOD OF ABRAHAM (1996).
101 Id.
102

BERNARD YACK,

THE FETISHISM

OF MODERNITIES:

EPOCHAL

CONSCIOUSNESS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1997).
103 DERRIDA, supra note 94, at 1-35.
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What then constitutes the Greek and the Christian for
Patocka's analysis? Patocka grounds his Greek representation
on Plato's rendition in the Symposium of Socrates's interaction
with male beauty and the lesson that he teaches. Plato ascribes
Socrates's wisdom to his female sage-Diotima."' Diotima
teaches Socrates to contemplate the beauty of the one he
admires and would love, but to not act on that beauty. In that
way, Socrates instructs that the lover will learn how to know
the true lineaments of beauty and to transcend the particular
case to a more exalted understanding.15

Patocka argues that the Platonic move pushes
philosophy past the exuberance and delirium associated with
previous Greek religiosity that signified the human will for
ecstatic merger with the Godhead. 16 Plato has Socrates
separate himself from the need to fuse. Socrates recognizes the
need as desire and the desire as an impediment to spiritual
growth. Individuation, not orgy, is the Socratic instruction. The
beautiful is the good to which reason points, or it points to
nothing at all and can only be obtained by consciousness
through the frustration of desire. Socrates banishes orgy.
Socrates also establishes the intent to act so as to achieve
higher understanding as something very different from the will
to power. As Euripides discerned and warned, however,
Dionysus is not so readily dismissed.'7

According to Patocka, Christianity, in its triumph over
the Greek good and its rationality, historically and
metaphysically instantiated a Christian representation of God
as the model of human responsibility. Patocka's sense of
Christian responsibility identifies God as a "Person who sees
into the soul without being itself accessible to view," exemplary
of responsibility over the more rational commitments
exemplified by Maimonides and, at least probably, by St.
Thomas Aquinas.0 8 Mankind as an image of God has occupied
Old Testament commentators from the very beginning of
commentary. Maimonides, the famous Jewish metaphysician
and rationalist, argued in The Guide of the Perplexed that
humanity is Godlike in its capacity to reason, not in any
104

See Plato, The Symposium, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 553-63 (Edith

Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
105 Id.
106 PATOCKA, supra note 91, at 103-06.
107 See THE BACCHAE OF EURIPIDES (C.K. Williams trans., 1990).
10s PATOCKA, supra note 91, at 107.
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identification with a corporeal object representing God.' 9 In
this, Maimonides is in accord with Plato and Aristotle, both of
whom influenced his thought. He, in turn, integrated Aristotle
into the work of the great Moslem theologians, as did Thomas
Aquinas, who, like his teacher, studied Maimonides.
Patocka's point is that God's transformation to human
form, forced to experience human passion, suffering and
finitude, provided a model of human responsibility more
intimate and less cerebral than the Greek good."' Patocka,
however, both laments the potential twilight of the Christian
revelation and the fact that it did not enter more deeply and
critically into human consciousness."' He argues that there is
much to develop in Christian responsibility.'12 He fears that
technocracy invaded human consciousness to such an extent
that the Christian moment of revelation becomes nugatory."3
Where Patocka agrees with Heidegger about the causal,
dire implications of technology for the human spirit, Levinas,
recognizing the problem of technology, maintains that
technology is necessary for humanity to respond adequately to
food shortages and famine, to provide for the substantive good
for individual existence."' But Heidegger's notion of care and
its ontological centrality to his philosophy is sterile and
abstract. This is the point of Patocka's insistence on the
particularity of the Person as a model of human responsibility.
But the Person remains mysterium tremendum and, therefore,
secret, not worked through in Christian and not, therefore, the
European self-understanding of responsibility. And now we are
in danger of losing that advance over the pre-Platonic moment.
Regardless of the status of technology, aiding or mystifying
human existence cannot be universalized without losing the
difference required by individuals who are at very different
levels of development, capacity and need.
Hans Jonas, another student of Heidegger, makes this
point much like Patocka. In his general discussion of the role of
philosophy in everyday life in his essay, Philosophy at the End
of the Century, Jonas criticizes his brilliant teacher on two
109

MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED (Shlomo Pines trans.,

1963).
PATOCKA, supra note 91, at 108-09.
Id. at 111-18.

112Id. at

117-18.

"' Id. at 118.
114 For

Levinas on technology, see CAYGILL, supra note 85, at 91-92.
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points.' 5 First, Jonas attacks Heidegger's concept of care for its
sterile quality, his failure to really probe what human care
must entail. In his analysis, Jonas observes that Heidegger
follows an ideal strain in philosophy that separates the human
spirit from fundamental, everyday bodily need."6 Jonas also
notes the fissure between Heidegger's ontology of care and his
practice in the world as the rector of a university that
embraced Nazi ideology and his repudiation of former
colleagues and friends for their Judaism or other anti-Nazi
commitments. Jonas wonders about the brilliant Heidegger's
support of evil in the world and contrasts Heidegger with
another of his philosophy teachers, Julius Ebbinghaus, whose
"strict and uncompromising" Kantianism supported him in a
steadfast resistance to Hitler." ' Heidegger's atrocious behavior
and brilliant philosophy, and Ebbinghaus's less original
philosophic commitments but ethical heroism cause Jonas to
question philosophic brilliance and the philosophic project itself
as it relates to living the wise and just life.
Patocka cautions that we are subject to losing the
principal issue of actualizing a Christian responsibility with
the many particulars that engage human thinking and
practice." 8 Technology is here to stay. Any attempt to claim
that it has confounded the human spirit as the independent
factor must come to terms with how to harness technology so it
,does not hide the question of human responsibility. But the
various attempts to demonize a particular set of human
practices and institutions for causing a falling away from
human responsiveness to the other must reconcile the fact that
Western theology and philosophy have grappled with the
deficit of human care for the other. Western societies have
engaged this problem, from the Hebrew prophets and Jesus's
Sermon on the Mount to Plato's attempts at providing
arguments and maps for just people even in unjust conditions.
Neither technology nor capitalism caused the existence that
Bergman directs at us to our shame.
This essay appears in Hans Jonas's MORTALITY AND MORALITY: A SEARCH
FOR THE GOOD AFTER AUSCHWITZ (Lawrence Vogel ed., 1996). See also HANS JONAS,
THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHICS FOR THE
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1984).
JONAS, MORTALITY AND MORALITY, supra note 115, at 47.
117 Id. at 49.
,l8 Jan Patocka, Is Technological Civilization Decadent, And Why?, in
115

HERETICAL ESSAYS, supra note 91, at 95. In this essay, Patocka analyzes the
genealogies of responsibility that undergird Western metaphysics.
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CONCLUSION

In Shame, Bergman makes clear that self-defense,
confined to self-protection in the face of evil, can assure
survival. But the survival gained, if gained, is at the cost of
human meaning. So what do we owe to the other? Bergman,
Bonhoeffer, Levinas and Patocka suggest everything-and for
our own good. When Plato argued in The Republic that justice
is such an intrinsic good that it is better to be just and appear
foolish, he set an unpersuasive standard philosophically.
Patocka's claim that the Christian notion of responsibility must
be actualized or we will face a fall greater than that of the
abyss of World War II falls on deaf ears. The world seems to
negate both Plato's insistence for the just life and the prophets'
or Christian call for responsibility to the other. Manachean
heresy seems to be winning the day. Too many are being forced
into the rhetoric and practice of crusade. The return of the
repressed implication of the ontological reality of choosing sides
between a putative necessary good or evil, of evil empires and
axes of evil, ignores what Bergman's Shame, as an already
forgotten work, taught: The loss is ultimately ours. Bergman
does not tell us what to do but shows us what inaction does. We
will ignore the civil rights of a class of citizens in the name of
security and it will be common sense to do so. We can hardly be'
expected to look out for others-aliens, strangers-when we
fear, distrust or disdain our own. Levinas always feared the
potential idolatry of even the state of Israel, for whose
existence he wished and defended. Bonhoeffer gave his life in
responsibility and remained an authoritarian Lutheran."9
Patocka lamented the continued need to become Christian.
Bergman showed what happens when we have lost a sense of
shame.
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Carl

Rasmussen,

Justice, Justification, and Responsibility in

Bonhoeffer's Ethics, in 4 GRAVEN IMAGES: ESSAYS IN CULTURE, LAW AND THE SACRED,
supra note 26, at 86 (describing Bonhoeffer as authoritarian).

